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A government-wide realignment of the US intelligence apparatus leads to fundamental changes in how military intelligence operates and by whom it is controlled and monitored. While there is no visible change regarding the allocation of "roles and missions" between CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence operations, increasing "civilianization" of the latter is evident . . .

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

**Streamlined,
Centralized,
Civilianized**

BY EDGAR ULSAMER, SENIOR EDITOR

IN MAY, the Pentagon, in extension of a White House Executive Order issued earlier this year, started a major overhaul of its several intelligence branches, including a reassessment of how, and by whom, they are to be managed, controlled, and supervised. Some of the attendant changes are penetrating, others cosmetic. Together they clearly signal more "civilianization" of military intelligence and closer rapport

USAF review(s) completed.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

AIR FORCE

with intelligence consumers and other constituents of the intelligence community.

There were also sanguine assertions by the Pentagon that, by making the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) a "recognized and acknowledged center of excellence" in intelligence analysis and estimating, its judgments will carry more weight. The risk of DIA estimates that are at odds with those of the CIA going unheeded, DoD claimed, would lessen as a result. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth told *AIR FORCE Magazine*: "There will be more competition [among the producers of intelligence], and we hope that this will cause a veering away from the tendency to estimate toward a common denominator."

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, he said, there was a "marked, and in retrospect, demonstrable tendency to underestimate the rate at which the Soviets would deploy their strategic missile forces," in part because of pressures within the "system—and I don't mean improper, specific political pressures—to estimate toward a common denominator." Secretary Ellsworth is DoD's ranking intelligence executive and a member of the new three-member US Committee on Foreign Intelligence. Another related cause for underestimating Soviet strategic efforts in the past was "drifts away from reality" predicated on the desire that "pervaded the thinking of that era" to believe that the Soviets, like the US, sought stability through strategic parity, Secretary Ellsworth said.

The President's Executive Order 11905 of February 1976 realigning the US intelligence community in general, and DoD's subsequent internal changes, both seek "to improve the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments and agencies, and to establish effective oversight."

Fundamental Changes

On the highest level, the National Security Council directs and guides the development and formulation of US intelligence activities with a new and specific mandate to conduct semiannual reviews that consider "the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national foreign-policy objectives."

Reporting to the NSC is the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence, the senior national intelligence body, composed of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is the committee's chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense who oversees intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Committee decisions may be reviewed by the National Security Council upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the NSC. (Statutory members of the



Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth, DoD's ranking intelligence executive, assumed office on January 2, 1976.

NSC are the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense.)

Another new body is the Operations Advisory Group, which considers and develops policy recommendations—and deals with dissents—concerning special intelligence activities in support of national foreign-policy objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the DCI belong to the Operations Advisory Group.

The Executive Order also creates an Intelligence Oversight Board whose three members, drawn from "outside the government," monitor the practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of the intelligence community. This Board reports to the Attorney General and the President, and concerns itself mainly with activities by the intelligence community that raise questions of legality and propriety.

The Defense Intelligence Structure

The Defense Department's realignment of its intelligence activities, arrived at with the agreement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, includes these central actions:

- Creation of the post of Department of Defense Inspector General for Intelligence who reports *directly* to the Deputy Secretary of Defense who oversees intelligence. The IG also maintains liaison with the new Intelligence Oversight Board.

- A Defense Intelligence Board composed of senior military and civilian defense policy-makers will be established, on a six-month trial basis, to bridge the gap between the producers and users of intelligence.

- Designation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as Director of Defense

Intelligence (DDI), exercising line authority over DoD intelligence functions under the overall cognizance of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and providing staff support to OSD.

- The DDI is given management authority over the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA), and is responsible for coordinating all intelligence functions of the military services.

- The DDI will have a Principal Deputy and two deputies—a Deputy for Programs and Resources and a Deputy for Intelligence Production, Plans, and Operations, who also serves as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. While DIA is now a part of the civilian echelon in terms of policy, line authority, and management, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to exercise operational control over that agency in the areas of their own intelligence needs and those of the unified and specified commands. The NSA's status as the government's overall signals intelligence branch is changed only to the extent that the DDI now acts as the surrogate for the Secretary of Defense who retains final responsibility for the agency.


- The Defense Intelligence Agency, with a staff of about 4,500 people, is being reorganized

can't be ruled out "forever," according to Secretary Ellsworth.

In response to a question about rotating defense intelligence leadership among the services, he said: "My goal for all of the key defense intelligence positions is to fill them with the best qualified available individuals. Therefore, service rotation as such will not be the governing factor in selecting the Directors of DIA and NSA or any of their immediate subordinates."

The Meaning Behind the Changes

Among the reasons for the changes in defense intelligence, Secretary Ellsworth told *Air Force Magazine*, was the need to "turn the spotlight on intelligence production, the most difficult phase of the job. Our intelligence collection is very good; that is to say, we can count well. But we need better analysis and estimating, which depends on brilliance of mind and articulateness. This we want to stimulate through the accountability and recognition that the realignment accords to production. I expect the DIA, through the improvement in quality of its work, through strengthening of its accountability and recognition of its work, to develop into a center of excellence in this town and in



to improve the quality of analysis and estimating that goes to Pentagon and other government policy-makers. Two major divisions have been formed, one headed by the Vice Director for Plans, Operations, and Support, who controls the defense attachés, and the other by the Vice Director for Production. The DIA Director, for the foreseeable future, is to be a general officer of three-star rank, although the prospect of a civilian taking over eventually

this government and challenge other agencies engaged in intelligence analysis and estimating."

Creation of the Defense Intelligence Board, although concerned with better intelligence production, is meant primarily to improve the relationship between producers and users, especially "policy-level users" of intelligence, Secretary Ellsworth said. The problem, he added, is that "the intelligence community tends to be incestuous, to brook no outside evaluation, and to

work toward its own goals, just as most other professional groups tend to do. Policy-makers, on the other hand, have a propensity for criticizing the intelligence community, *after* the fact. They tend to lack the time to tell intelligence what they need and want. The Intelligence Board is going to be the crucible where we hope to force these two worlds to talk to each other cohesively, to come together."

The fact that DIA has been placed under civilian control, Secretary Ellsworth said, does not increase the risk of "politicizing" the agency or of making it more susceptible to tailoring its product to the political objectives of a given administration. The reason why the restructuring "should decrease the risk of politicizing military intelligence is that we . . . reduce the middlemen sitting between an analyst or producer and the person needing the intelligence. For instance, daily intelligence goes directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS from the producing elements of DIA," without passing through the various intelligence echelons of the Pentagon, Secretary Ellsworth said. The realignment, he added, "increases the directness of support, that is, by cutting out those who can politicize an analyst's report"; and, secondly, by creating incentives for better products at the analyst level through career development. Overall, the standing of DIA within the intelligence hierarchy was elevated by "double-hatting" its director as a Deputy Director of Defense Intelligence and, thus, lending him the "direct policy and management support" of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Ellsworth suggested.

Key to boosting the quality of intelligence is the DoD-wide Intelligence Career Development Program, affecting both military and civilian personnel. In general, the Secretary said, "my concerns center on analyst professionalism—those who actually produce intelligence—and on maintaining distinct, effective career patterns. I would also encourage the services to include combat intelligence as an element of military intelligence career patterns. Basic combat knowledge is a major ingredient in analyzing foreign military intelligence at the departmental and national level." The responsibility of guiding and shaping the Department's intelligence career development now rests with the DDI. A recent congressional recommendation to apply to DIA Public Law 313 (which permits freer hiring of civilian professionals by exceptions to Civil Service rules and regulations) is looked upon with favor by the Pentagon, Secretary Ellsworth said.

The Role of Service Intelligence

In restructuring defense intelligence, the Defense Department carefully noted that the DDI will "coordinate but not direct" intelligence



Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, USA, was named Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency on May 17 of this year.

operations of the military services because much of this activity is at a tactical level and under the direction of specific commanders or the services' staffs. The DDI's role, Secretary Ellsworth said, is to obtain from the intelligence branches of the services specialized scientific and technical intelligence as well as to arrange collection operations that they are uniquely qualified for, "to exercise general coordination over service intelligence operations, and to review and recommend on service intelligence resources." In most cases, DIA will carry out coordination of this kind for the DDI, he added.

DoD, he said, has perceived "for some years now that tactical intelligence could be improved through better integration of the various intelligence disciplines at field headquarters. . . ." Rapid technological advances on both the Soviet and US sides compound the need for fast intelligence reaction: "Our effectiveness in tactical intelligence depends on how rapidly intelligence staffs can process, evaluate, and display tactical indicators for their commanders," Secretary Ellsworth pointed out. Also, important perishable combat intelligence often remains bottled up at major headquarters because of security classification and doesn't reach the operational units in time. "Through my participation in both the Committee on Foreign Intelligence at the national level and by drawing on proposals . . . of the Defense Intelligence Board, I believe that both the DDI and I are in a better position to resolve policy questions concerning tactical intelligence which are beyond the authority of Defense alone," he told AIR FORCE Magazine.

Coordination With CIA

"The main line of demarcation" between Defense Department intelligence activities and

the CIA is drawn by the unique professional competence of DoD analysts in the disciplines of military technology, organization, tactics, doctrine, and training, according to Secretary Ellsworth. Expertise of this type "alone can provide the basis for the production of military intelligence information" used by the Pentagon as well as civilian elements of government, especially so far as threat assessments are concerned. The intelligence information on which defense planning is based, therefore, remains the domain of the DDI, while such areas as the National Intelligence Estimate, the Strategic Target List, and SALT verification will continue to be handled jointly with the CIA and other elements of the US intelligence community. The development of the strategic target list, he said, "is the result of work of military people as well as of civilian economists and scientists. Its compilation is not the exclusive domain of military intelligence," Secretary Ellsworth pointed out.

Neither the general revamping of the US intelligence community nor the realignment of defense intelligence is expected to affect the specific contributions of DIA, CIA, and the individual service intelligence operations in monitoring SALT terms by the so-called national technical means of verification. These include photographic, radar, and electronic surveillance capabilities, seismic instrumentation to supply information on the location and magnitude of underground nuclear explosions, sensitive air-sampling systems, and advanced, sophisticated techniques for analyzing and evaluating the data collected, none of which "operate from installations in the territory of the parties being monitored," according to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The various means of verification presumably include reconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit, a possibility that invariably draws a "no comment" response by government spokesmen.

Overall responsibility for SALT studies, assessments, and guidance continues to center in the Verification Panel of the National Security Council, according to Secretary Ellsworth. He added emphatically that special national reconnaissance programs over which the Defense Department has executive responsibility "stay as before." This is true in terms of operations as well as budget. "Although the Executive Order [of February 1976] assigns the task of preparing the government's budget for all foreign intelligence operations to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, it in no way curtails the Secretary of Defense's responsibility for operating and funding those functions that are under his stewardship," Secretary Ellsworth said.

The Secretary explained that added emphasis will be placed on technological intelligence, even though he took issue with the often-stated con-

tention that there have been frequent misreadings of Soviet technological capabilities. Public perception of unclassified intelligence information, or decisions of the political leadership based on incomplete information, are not always a reliable index of the quality of US intelligence, he said. "In almost all cases, the intelligence has proved to be both accurate and timely. It is true and also desirable that there is usually little public discussion of these issues, since discussion could jeopardize the intelligence sources and methods."

Nevertheless, Soviet and other nations' progress in advanced technology that could lead to significant improvements of existing weapons, or the creation of revolutionary weapon systems, is "a question of key national interest" under constant review, he said. A concrete result of this increased emphasis is the appointment of Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, as chairman of the government-wide foreign intelligence technology panel. Also, the Director of DIA established a "DoD-wide task force to develop an integrated and well-coordinated intelligence program dealing with the status of advanced technology in the USSR. This task force will review the current intelligence efforts in this area, and make recommendations to increase the scope and usefulness of technical intelligence reporting," according to Secretary Ellsworth.

The realignment of US intelligence at the government-wide and DoD levels does not deal specifically with the "severe problem of counterintelligence," according to Secretary Ellsworth. "This field of intelligence is a growing problem because of the openness of our society and because of the increasing boldness of those who take advantage of our openness. It is, however, not an overwhelming problem, and we see no need for, or even desirability in, requesting special legislation dealing with this issue—certainly nothing like the British Official Secrets Act, which would not be compatible with our system of government," he explained.

The reorganization of defense intelligence, if anything, will increase the degree of candor with which the Pentagon plans to report to the American people about evolving military threats. "We will share with the public as much of this information as we can without endangering our sources and methods of doing business. We plan to release information about the Soviet threat as it is produced and without regard to political expediency or the budget cycle. This candor already has increased public recognition of the high rate of Soviet arms development and deployment. The public has a right to be informed about these threats, in detail and without overstatement. We plan to intensify efforts in this regard," Secretary Ellsworth asserted.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
76-2657/A

Air Force

13 JUL 1976

Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear George:

Thank you for your recommendation concerning the treatment of follow-on offensive ballistic missile systems in this year's NIE 11-3/8-76. I have forwarded it to [] National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. He assures me that again this year the group preparing the estimate will seek to highlight the breadth and intensity of Soviet R and D programs relevant to strategic capabilities and will include sections in Chapter 2 describing as explicitly and comprehensively as possible the new or modified ICBMs and SLBMs which are now in gestation.

[] informs me that this year a new effort will be made to develop a special annex for the NIE to cover Soviet advanced technological concepts for strategic weapons. Any contribution Air Force intelligence can make to that effort will be much appreciated.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank you for your willingness to make [] available to serve on the team managing the NIE. I understand that he has made significant contributions to the team in the past, and we look forward to his participation as a member of it this year.

As you suggested, I plan to read the OWI study on new Soviet missile systems as soon as it has been completed.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

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